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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Attribution theory, broadly conceived, has evolved over
the years from the theoretical writings of Fritz Heider
1958).

(1946,

Heider's work was primarily concerned with how an out

side observer perceives the causes of another person's behav
ior; that is, how does an individual come to know and compre
hend the dispositions of other people?

Heider's work was

largely theoretical, but in recent years there has been re
newed interest, both theoretical and empirical, in Heider's
analysis.

This new interest has come to be called "attribu

tion theory"

(Kelley, 196 7).

Attribution theory is concerned

with a person's appraisal of the causality relationships in
various situations and the part this appraisal plays in subse
quent behavior

(Kelley, 1967, 197 3).

Heider's basic concern of how an outside observer per
ceives the causes of another's behavior has been recently ex
tended to the question of "how does a person come to know and
understand himself?"

Traditionally, the question of self-

knowledge has been in the realm of philosophy and has been
approached phenomenologically rather than empirically.

Re

cently this question has been addressed by Bern (1965, 1967,
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1972) within a theoretical structure he calls self-perception
theory, which is, for the most part, synonymous with attribu
tion theory

(Kelley, 1973).

Bern postulated that a person comes

to understand himself in much the same way that a person learns
of the attitudes, beliefs and dispositions of other people;
that is, we learn of our own attitudes and dispositions, at
least in part,

from self-observation and from these observa

tions we infer

what we are like.

Bern (1965, 1972) presented two basic postulates that form
the heart of his self-perception theory:

individuals infer

!

their beliefs, attitudes and dispositions, in some degree,
from their behavior and from the situation in which their be 
havior occurs and, secondly,

. . t o the extent that in

ternal cues are weak, ambiguous, or uninterpretable, the in
dividual is functionally in the same position as an outside
observer, an observer who must necessarily rely upon those
same external cues to infer the individual's inner states
(1972, p. 2)."

Bern maintained,

then, that we observe our be

havior towards

some entity and from watching our behavior

we

infer what our

attitudes and beliefs must be towards that

en

tity .
Bern's theoretical formulations rest firmly upon the func
tional verbal analysis of the so called "radical behaviorists"
(Bern, 1965; Skinner,

1953, 1957) .

This functional approach

attempts to specify the discriminative stimuli that control a
person's self-descriptive statements.

Following Skinner

(1957),
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Bern maintained that a functional verbal analysis is central
to any conceptualization of personal epistomology

(Bern, 1965).

In fact, Bern felt that "It was Skinner's analysis which in
spired 'self-perception theory'
Skinner's

. . . (1972, p. 2)."

(1957) analysis of verbal behavior essentially

concluded that an individual's training to respond differen
tially to internal states must necessarily be a product of
social interaction.

Verbal statements of self-description

must be originally learned and based upon public stimuli.
Bern (1965) argued that one of the implications of Skinner's
work is " . . . that many of the self-descriptive statements
that appear to be exclusively under the discriminative control
of private stimulation may, in fact, remain under the control
of the same public events which members of the community them
selves must use in 'inferring' the individual's inner states
(1965, p. 199)."

Bern, therefore, regarded the individual as

an observer of his own behavior as well as the controlling
variables involved in his behavior and it is, at least in
part, from these observations that a person comes to "know"
his attitudes, beliefs and dispositions.
Empirical support for self-perception theory comes from
a number of experimental sources.

Bern (1965, 1967, 1972) has

reviewed the studies corroborating cognitive dissonance theory
and has been able to account for the major findings within
his self-perception model.
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Cognitive Dissonance
Festinger's

(1957) theory of cognitive dissonance postu

lates that if an individual holds two cognitions that are in
consistent with one another, he will experience the pressure
of an aversive state called cognitive dissonance.

The organism

will seek to reduce this aversive drive state either by chang
ing his attitudes, beliefs or his behavior.

Dissonance theory,

then, accounts for observed differences between stimulus con
ditions and responses by postulating ah internal hypothetical
drive state.

Bern's alternative explanation " . . .

eschews

any reference to hypothetical internal processes and seeks,
rather, to account for observed functional relations between
stimuli and responses in terms of the individual's past train
ing history

(Bern, 1967, p. 184)."

Bern's reinterpretation of

dissonance theory is from an information-processing standpoint
where,

"The dependent variable is viewed simply as a self

attribution based on the available evidence, which includes
the overt behavior of the communication and the apparent con
trolling variables of the behavior

(Bern, 1972, p. 17)."

A widely investigated paradigm of cognitive dissonance
theory is known as the forced compliance or insufficient jus
tification studies.

In the typical forced compliance study

(Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959)

subjects are induced to perform

some behavior under circumstances that do not justify the be
havior.

Furthermore, the behavior engaged in would imply the
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subject's endorsement of some attitude or belief counter to
his own.

For example, in a now classic study, Festinger and

Carlsmith

(1959) asked subjects to tell a fellow subject that

a boring, repetitive task was enjoyable and interesting.
doing this, subjects were paid either $1 or $20.

For

A predic

tion in line with dissonance theory would be that the subjects
paid $1 would find the contingencies insufficient to justify
their behavior and would, therefore, seek to alter their atti
tudes about how interesting the task was.

Subjects in the $20

condition would find justification enough and would not alter
their attitudes about how enjoyable and interesting the task
was.

Results of the Festinger and Carlsmith study and others

using the forced compliance paradigm
196 2) supported these predictions.

(e.g., Brehm and Cohen,
That is, in terms of

cognitive dissonance theory, subjects in the $1 condition,
not having been paid well enough to excuse lying, would have
to eliminate the dissonance created by the lie by changing
their attitude to fit the statement.
In terms of self-perception theory the subject in the
Festinger and Carlsmith study is an observer of his own b e 
havior and he implicitly asks himself,
be if I behave in such a fashion?"

"What must my attitude

The subject who receives

the $20 inducement sees that his behavior is adequately ac
counted for by the large inducement;
because I am being paid $20."

that is, "I am doing this

The $1 subject cannot regard
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the inducement as adequate justification for his behavior.
Asking the question of "what must my attitude be?", he infers
that his behavior must reflect his actual attitude and, there
fore, evaluates the task as enjoyable.

Thus, self-perception

theory is able to arrive at the same conclusions without pos
tulating an internal motivational state
Bern, in three extensive articles

(Bern, 1965).

(1965, 1967, 1972), has

reviewed the literature of cognitive dissonance and has argued
that the dissonance results are " . . . consistent with the
present

(self-perception)

analysis

(Bern, 1965, p. 209)."

Pre

dictably, the re-evaluation of such a widely investigated theory
has generated a controversy of arguments, counter arguments and
the hope of a "crucial" experiment that would unequivocally dif
ferentiate the two positions.
"crucial" experiments

There have been a number of

(e.g., Bern and McConnell, 1970) but the

results are equivocal.

The two positions seem to be at an em

pirical and logical impasse.

Bern has stated " . . . it seems

unlikely that a 'crucial' experiment for discriminating between
(dissonance theory and self-perception theory) will ever be
executed . . . (Bern and McConnell, 1970, p.

30)."

The re-

evaluation of cognitive dissonance theory, then, provides in
direct support for Bern's notions but does not unequivocally
support either theory.

Importantly, self-perception theory is

a more parsimonious explanation in that it does not postulate
an internal drive state.

7
Cognition and Emotional States
Ancillary support for self-perception is found in the
work of Schachter and his colleagues
emotional states.

(Schachter, 1964) on

Although these studies were not specifi

cally designed to provide empirical data for Bern's self
perception theory, they can be profitably viewed as support
for his basic assumptions.
In a now classic series of studies, Schachter and his
colleagues demonstrated that emotional states are not deter
mined by physiological responses alone, but involve cognitive
appraisal and the evaluation of the external stimulus environ
ment.

Schachter

(1964) proposed three basic propositions that

followed from his fundamental supposition that " . . .

emo

tional states are a function of the interaction of . . . cog
nitive factors with a state of physiological arousal
p. 53)."

(1964,

First, given a state of physiological arousal for

which an individual has no immediate explanation available, he
will "label" this state and describe his feelings in terms of
the cognitions available to him; secondly, if an individual
has a completely appropriate explanation for a physiological
state he will not look to external cues to evaluate it; and,
thirdly, that an individual will "label" his feelings as emo
tions only to the extent that he experiences an aroused state
(Schachter, 1964).
Schachter and Singer

(1962) designed an experiment to

test the above assumptions.

Subjects were led

to believe that
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they were involved in a study of the effects of vitamin com
pounds on vision.

They agreed to receive an injection of a

vitamin called "Suproxin."

Depending upon the condition sub

jects actually received either epinephrine

(adrenaline) which

has the effect of increasing blood pressure, heart rate, res
piration rate and muscle and cerebral blood flow, or they re
ceived an injection of a placebo

(saline solution).

Subjects were divided into four groups and presented with
various explanations of the effects of the drug "Suproxin."
The first group, Epinephrine Informed, was

told that Suproxin

side-effects were increased heart rate, shaking of the hands,
and possibly their face might become warm and flushed; essen
tially, the effects of an injection of epinephrine.
group, Epinephrine Ignorant, was

The second

not told of any side effects.

The third group, Epinephrine Misinformed, was told symptoms
which are not consequences of an injection of epinephrine and
thus provided the subjects with an inappropriate explanation
of their feelings.

Subjects in the above three conditions

were all injected with the drug epinephrine.
subjects were injected with a placebo

In a fourth group,

(saline solution)

and

were given the instructions as the Epinephrine Ignorant group.
The next step was the manipulation of an emotional-inducing
cognition.

The two states were Euphoria and Anger; two very

different emotional states.
(an experimenter confidant)

In the Euphoria condition, a stooge
introduced himself, made a few
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introductory comments, and then began a sequence of whimsi
cal activities

(e.g., throwing paper as a game of basket

ball, hoola hooping, etc.).

Subjects were gathered in the

room to wait for the drug to take effect.

In the Anger con

dition/ during the filling out of a questionnaire the stooge
made a series of standardized comments, starting innocently,
then becoming increasingly querrulus and ended in rage, rip
ping up his questionnaire and stomping out of the room.
Through the above manipulation,

Schachter and Singer

were able to demonstrate that when subjects were not provided
with an appropriate explanation for their arousal

(Drug Ig

norant group), they would erroneously attribute it to an ex
ternal source.

Furthermore, the same emotional state

(epine

phrine produced), could lead to various emotional labels as
disparate as euphoria and anger.

This study, then, demonstrated

that one could manipulate an individual's self-attributions
concerning his emotional state by manipulating external stimu
lus cues.
It has been known for some time that pain perception is
only partially a function of the pain producing stimulus
ber, 1959; Melzack, 1961).

(Bar

Certainly the pain producing

stimulus itself provides information for an individual's judg
ment of pain.

Attribution theorists have examined the extent

to which the attribution process contributes to the judgment
of pain.
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Nisbett and Schachter

(1966), extending the earlier

findings on emotional arousal, examined whether subjects
could misattribute shock produced arousal to an external
source.

Subjects were given a placebo prior to taking a

series of increasing electric shocks.

They were asked to

report when the shocks became painful and when they became
too painful to tolerate.

One group of subjects was

told

that the effects of the pill would be general autonomic
arousal while another group was

told that symptoms would

not be those generally associated with fear arousal.
hypothesized,

They

and found, that subjects who assumed that their

arousal was produced by the drug would tolerate a greater in
tensity of shock than subjects who attributed their arousal to
the shock alone..

In sum, they demonstrated that subjects

could be led to attribute stimulus-produced arousal to an
external source.
The general finding that subjects can misattribute their
emotional arousal to an emotionally irrelevant source has been
demonstrated in a number of research reports

(Dienstbier and

Munter, 1971; Beaman, Diener, Tefft, and Fraser, 19 72).
bardo, Cohen, Weisenberg, Dworkin, and Firestone

(1966)

Zimfound

that subjects who were forced to receive experimental electric
shock reported the same intensity of electrical shock as more
painful and were also more physiologically responsive
than subjects who volunteered to participate.

(GSR)

11
In a study similar to the misattribution manipulation
of Nisbett and Schachter

(1966), Ross, Rodin, and Zimbardo

(1969.) attempted to have subjects misattribute arousal accom
panying the fear of anticipated electric shock to noise heard
over a set of headphones.

Subjects were given the choice of

working on either of two insplvable puzzles while listening
to the noise.

Subjects were told that solving one puzzle

would gain them money, solving the other would allow them to
avoid a threatened shock.

Half of the subjects were told that

the noise had side effects that correspond to fear arousal
(e.g., rapid breathing, viseral upset, e t c . ) , and half were
told side effects that do not correspond to fear arousal
(e.g., ringing in the ears, headache, etc.).

The dependent

variable was the amount of time spent on the insolvable puz
zles.

The amount of time a subject would spend working on

the shock puzzle, in contrast to the reward puzzle, could be
used as an indicator of the subject's fear of shock.

Subjects

that were given the opportunity to attribute their arousal
symptoms to the noise spent significantly more time working
on the reward puzzle than did subjects who could only attri
bute their arousal to the fear of shock.
Ross, et al. titled their article "Toward an attribu
tion therapy," and argued that their results had strong impli
cations for the therapeutic situation.
reasoning, Storms and Nisbett

Following this line of

(1970) extended the findings to
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the experimental treatment of insomnia.
to take a pill before bedtime.

Subjects were asked

Subjects were led to believe

that the pill, actually a placebo, would, for one group of
subjects, increase arousal and alertness

(generally symptoms

that subjects had previously reported as characteristic of a
night of insomnia).

The second group was told that the pill

would decrease arousal and alertness. Storms and Nisbett hy
pothesized that the subjects who were told that the pill would
produce alertness would attribute their alertness to the drug
rather than their emotionality, and therefore,
quickly than other groups.

fall asleep more

It was found that subjects who were

in the drug arousal group did report getting to sleep faster
on the nights when they took the pill.

In sum, the findings

suggested that individuals are able to reattribute arousal re
actions to external or circumstantial causes.
In an insightful extension of attribution theory, Beaman,
Diener, Tefft, and Fraser

(1972)' investigated the misattribu-

tion process in the treatment of test anxiety.
similar to Storms and Nisbett

In a paradigm

(1970) , test anxious subjects

were led to believe that a placebo had the side effects of
general emotional arousal
breathing, etc.).

(e.g., tremors, palpitations, rapid

Subjects were then placed in a testing sit

uation in which they could misattribute their emotional arousal
to an irrelevant source:

the pill.

Subjects in this condition

significantly decreased their scores on the Test Anxiety Scale
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assessed about one week later.

That is, after being given

the opportunity to reattribute their emotional arousal to a
nonemotional source, subjects subsequently reported a lowered
perception of their level of test anxiety.
In a study specifically designed to examine self-percep
tion theory, Bandler, Madaras and Bern (1968)

investigated

whether an individual's perception of a stimulus as uncomfor
table or painful is partially an inference from his observa
tion of his response to that stimulus. Male college students
were used in three experimental conditions:

escape condition,

no escape condition, and reaction time condition.

Prior to

the experimental conditions, subjects rated varying intensities
of shock on a one to seven scale.

After the series of shocks,

each subject was told that he would receive a shock and .5
second later a colored light would come on signaling one of
the three experimental conditions.

In the escape condition

(red light) the subject was told that he could escape the shock
by pressing a button.

In the no escape condition

(green light)

the subject was told that he should not turn off the shock un
less the shock was too uncomfortable.
condition

In the reaction time

(yellow light) the subject was asked to press the

button so that the experimenter could measure his reaction
time.

Pressing the button in this condition might or might

not terminate the shock.

Also, a demand characteristics con

trol group condition w.as run to rule out experimental bias
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artifacts.

Following each shock the subjects were asked to

rate the shock on a rating scale.

vResults indicated that

rated discomfort in the escape condition was significantly
higher than in the no escape condition.

Results further re

vealed that the "button press must be seen as a self-determined
'escape response'

if it is to serve as the basis of inference

for the individuals'
1968}."

discomfort judgment

(Bandler, et a l . ,

That is, the reaction time condition was significantly

lower than the escape condition and not significantly different
from the no escape condition.

In sum, an individual's percep

tion of a stimulus as uncomfortable or painful is, to some ex
tent, an inference from his.own observation of his response to
that stimulus.
The previous study lent strong support to Bern's postu
late that people infer their attitudes from the observation
of their own behavior.

Furthermore, the possibility that sub

jects in the escape condition might be more physiologically
aroused than in the other conditions received analysis through
the use of GSR.

Results

indicated that there was no signi-

cant difference between the experimental conditions as measured
by GSR.

The authors concluded that "the obtained rating dif

ferences can be attributed to subjects' inferences from ob
servation of their own response to the electrical shock
ler, et a l . , 1968)."

(Band
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Autonomic Activity as a Source of Cognitive Information
Within Schachter's

(1964)

cognitive-physiological theory

of emotion, physiological activity acts as a cue indicating the
intensity of the emotion and the cognitive evaluation of ex
ternal discriminative stimuli determines the quality of the
emotion.

Valins

(1966) examined the role of physiological

activity as a source of cognitive information.

Valins at

tempted to assertain whether an individual's self-attribution
could be influenced by autonomic feedback.
and his colleagues along these lines
1967)

The work of Valins

(e.g., Valins and Ray,

clearly supported Bern's self-perception theory.
Valins

(1966)

led subjects to believe that they were

hearing their own heart rate feedback while they viewed ten
slides of semi-nude females.

The heartbeats the subjects

heard were pre-programmed so as to appear that their heart
rate increased on viewing some of the slides.

Subjects rated

a slide as more attractive when it was associated with a heart
rate change.

They also found that, when the subjects were

given the chance to take home some of the slides, the ones
that were associated with a heart rate change were more fre
quently chosen.
In a follow-up study, Valins

(1972) examined the effect

of debriefing on subjects' rating of the nudes.

After telling

the subjects that the~ heart rate feedback was bogus, he found
that their ratings of attractiveness remained substantially
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unchanged.

Valins

(1972) explained this interesting result

from a hypothesis generating standpoint.

When subjects heard

the altered heart rate, they generated a hypothesis that "the
girl must be unusually attractive.

"Closer inspection simply

showed them what their 'subconscious' knew all the time
(Valins, 1972, p. 407)."

Then a searching process would

begin, seeking confirmation of the hypothesis.

In terms of

self-perception theory, this hypothesis-confirmation notion
could add new insight into the process by which one forms at
titudes and dispositions and will undoubtedly be of research
interest in the future.
Valins and Ray
(1966)

(1966) extended the findings of Valins

into the area of psychotherapy, specifically systematic

desensitization.

In systematic desensitization a person is

gradually exposed to a feared object when he is assumed to be
in a state of muscle relaxation.

Following their work on mis-

attribution of autonomic feedback they hypothesized that sys
tematic desensitization is as effective when individuals be
lieve they are relaxed as when they actually are relaxed.
Snake phobic subjects were told that the study involved phy
siological reactions to frightening stimuli

(snakes and shocks).

As in other studies, bogus heart rate feedback was used.

Sub

jects viewed slides, half had a picture of a snake and half
were printed with the work "SHOCK" —
accompanied by a mild shock.

the latter slides were

Only on the SHOCK slides did
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the programmed heart rate increase.

The authors assumed

" . . . that subjects might infer from this arousal infor
mation that, while they were afraid of shocks, they were not
afraid of snakes

(Nisbett and Valins,

1972, p. 73)."

The de

pendent variable was how close the subjects could approach a
snake.

Subjects who believed the heart feedback was their

own were able to approach the snake closer than control sub
jects .
Results in the area of autonomic feedback seems to lend
support to the notion that we infer our feelings about stimuli
from information about the degree and source of autonomic
arousal even when it is false.
Nisbett, 1972)

There is evidence

(Valins and

to suggest, however, that such inferences are

not necessarily passive or immediately accepted.

Instead,

" . . . subjects may actively attempt to validate their in
ferences before encoding them as truth

(Nisbett and Valins,

1972, p. 74)."

Mands and Tacts
Bern, as noted earlier, based a large part o.f his self
perception model upon the functional approach of the "radical
behaviorist," mainly Skinner's
havior.

(1959) analysis of verbal be

Again, Bern attempted to specify the discriminative

stimuli that control a person's self-descriptive statements.
Following Skinner, Bern argued that a person may discriminate
the verbalizations
"tacts."

of others and himself as "mands" and
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"A descriptive statement, a verbal response that is
under the control of some portion of the environment, is
classified as a 'tact'

(Bern, 1965, p. 200).''

Tacts, then,

are descriptive statements about the environment and the
speaker receives generalized reinforcements for these state
ments.

Attitude and belief statements are often tacts, for

example,

"I am thirsty"; tacts can describe behavior, for

example,

"I am gregarious."

"Mands" are " . . .

verbal responses that are under the

control of specific reinforcing contingencies
1965, p. 200)."

A person who emits a mand

. , . (Bern,

(comMAND; deMAND)

is requesting, asking for or demanding a specific reinforcer,
and it is only this specific property that will serve to re
inforce the response.

"Please get me my coat," is a mand;

mands need not be verbal, often gestures have mand character
istics.

Bern (1965) pointed out that mands are often disguised

as tacts:

" . . .

the television announcer who praises a pro

duct he is selling; his verbal behavior is a mand for the
salary he receives and may not at all be under the actual dis
criminative control of the features of the product he appears
to be tacting

(Bern, 1965, p. 201)."

y.

In summary, tacts can be seen as descriptive statements
about a stimulus that are elicited by an individual's intrin
sic feelings about a stimulus.

Mands, on the other hand, are

statements about a stimulus that are elicited by a person in
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order to gain a particular reinforcement from the environment;
statements under the control of circumstances other than the
individual's intrinsic feelings about the stimulus.
Any particular verbal statement may have both mand and
tact characteristics.. The television announcer,

for example,

might indeed find the product he is selling useful, and to
that extent he is tacting as well as manding.

The listener

must often discriminate the mand-tact characteristic of a
communication in order to infer a speaker's "true" beliefs •
and attitudes.

"A communicator is credible to the extent that

his communication is discriminated as a set of tacts, his cre
dibility is vitiated to the extent that he appears to be mand
ing in the form of disguised tacts

(Bern, 1965, p. 201)."

In a number of methodological approaches, Bern (1965,
1966) has attempted to empirically demonstrate the mand-tact
characteristic of belief and attitude inferences.

Within an

experimental methodology called "interpersonal simulation,"
Bern (1965) replicated the Festinger and Carlsmith
mentioned earlier.

(1959)

study

It will be recalled that subjects paid $1

or $20 for telling a stooge that a series of tasks were in
teresting when in fact they were boring and uninteresting.
Subjects in the $1 condition subsequently rated the task as
more enjoyable.

The subjects in this study were asked to

listen to a tape recording of a person who had participated
in an experiment involving two motor tasks.

Subjects in the
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experimental group were told that the person on the recording
had accepted an offer of either $1 or $20 to go into the
waiting room and tell the next subject that the boring tasks
were fun and enjoyable.

Subjects listened to the tape re

corded statements made about how enjoyable the tasks were.
Then they were asked to estimate the subjects'
wards the tasks.

attitude to

Observers of the subjects estimated the

person's attitude to be significantly more favorable than did
observers of either the $20 group or the control group.
Bern reasoned that " . . .

when asked to reason the true

attitude of the communicator, an outside observer would almost
certainly judge the $20 communication to be a mand . . . (1965,
p. 202," and the $1 communication would more likely be judged
a tact.

Bern felt

that the findings of this and other inter

personal simulation studies
perception.
observer

(e.g., Bern, 1965)

support self

That is, "If one places our hypothetical outside

(and the observer in the above study) and the com

municator in the same skin, the findings obtained by Festinger
and Carlsmith are the result (Bern, 1965, p. 202)."

Lie Light Studies
In the interpersonal simulation studies the stimulus oper
ations have had other functional properties.

In the study re

viewed, for example, money, due to an individual's past train
ing history, has a number of function reinforcing properties.
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In an attempt to provide more direct support, Bern (1965, 1966)
designed a methodology in which the stimulus operations would
have no other functional properties than those imputed in the
laboratory.
The first study utilizing this methodology was concerned
with attitude change.

In this study

(1965) the experimental

session was disguised as a tape-recording session to prepare
experimental materials for a future experiment that would try
to determine if individuals could, from voice recordings, de
tect an incorrect statement.

Subjects first filled out a 50-

item questionnaire on personal information.

Then each subject

underwent a training procedure in which he answered questions
about himself in the presence of a distinctively colored light.
The questions came from the personal information questionnaire,
and after each question was asked, a tape recorder was turned
on, automatically illuminating one of two colored lights.

The

subject was instructed to answer truthfully whenever the light
was amber.

Whenever the light was green he was instructed to

answer falsely and say it convincingly into the tape recorder.
For half of the subjects the presentations of the lights were
reversed, that is> the green light became the "truth" light
and the amber light became the "lie" light.
The subject learned, in this way, that whenever he spoke
in the presence of the amber light

(truth light) he could be

lieve himself and could not believe himself in the presence of
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the green light

(lie light).

After the training session,

subjects were shown a series of cartoons which they had pre
viously rated as neutral.

For each cartoon, the subject was

instructed to say that the cartoon was either "very funny"
or "very unfunny" into the tape recorder.

Sometimes the lie

light was illuminated and sometimes the truth light was il
luminated.

After the subject had tape recorded a response,

the light was turned off and he was asked to indicate his
attitude towards the cartoon.
In line with self-perception theory, the subjects changed
their attitudes about how funny the cartoons were when they
made their statements in the presence of the truth light.

In

terestingly, an awareness questionnaire was administered and
Bern rep o r t e d (1965) that no subject was aware of any attitude
change nor of the effects of the lights.

"The cartoon study

demonstrated that the self-attributions known as attitude
statements could be brought under the control of an indivi
dual's own verbal behavior and the accompanying stimulus con
ditions in which that behavior occurs

(Bern, 1972, p. 10)."

Using the same methodology, Bern (1966)

attempted to ex

tend the evidence for self-perception to a different kind of
dependent variable:

the recall of prior events.

The same

procedure as above was used, but instead of cartoons subjects
were given a list of 100 common nouns and an alphabetical list
containing 50 of those nouns.

Their task was to cross out
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each word on the master
cal list.

list that appeared on the alphabeti

This was the behavior that, later,

the subject

would be asked to recall.
After the preliminary training session described above,
subjects were asked to make statements about the 100 nouns.
Again, true statements were made in the presence of one col
ored light and false statements were made in the presence of
another colored light.

After the subject had made a state

ment, the recorder and light were

turned off, and the subject

was asked to recall whether or not he had crossed out the word.
Again the results were in line with the self-perception
hypothesis; subjects'

false confession in the presence of the

"lie" light had no effect on recall.

In the presence of the

truth light, false confessions did produce significant error
in recall.

Maslach

(1971) replicated Bern's major finding

that the truth light produced more errors of recall following
the false confession.
Using essentially the same procedure as described above,
Linder and Jones

(1969) demonstrated that post-experimental

attitudes could be affected by recording a counter-attitudinal
statement in the presence of a light previously associated with
correct statements.

Importantly, Linder and Jones were only

able to obtain this effect if the subjects were given the
choice to read the counterattitudinal statement.
the subjects were required to read the statement

That is, if
(opposed to
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being asked to read the statement)
found.
tion.

the attitude change was not

This finding is congruent with the mand-tact distinc
If the subject was required to read the statement

(manding), he discriminates it as more mand than tact

(the

light influence), and later statements will not be influenced.
Self-perception theory; then, has found both direct and
indirect support from a number of experimental sources:
re-evaluation of cognitive dissonance

the

(Bern, 1965, 1967, 1972);

the work of Schachter and his colleagues on emotional states
(Schachter, 1964; Schachter and Singer,
back and misattribution

1962); autonomic feed

(Valins, 1966; Valins and Ray, 1967;
i

Beaman, Diener, Tefft, Fraser,

1972; Nisbett fand Valins,

Direct support has come from Bern's own research
1967; Bern and McConnell, 1970)
tions of his methodology
and Jones,

1969).

1972).

(196 5, 1966,

and from extensions and replica

(Bandler, Madaras, Bern, 196 8; Linder

Bern's basic notion that we infer our atti

tudes, beliefs and dispositions, at least in part, from self
observations of our behavior and the situation in which it occurs
has been widely supported.

CHAPTER II
RATIONALE OF PRESENT STUDY

Research in attribution theory has almost exclusively
been concerned with attitudes and beliefs and how they are,
at least in part, an inference drawn from self-observation.
Beaman, et al.

(1972) , however, have demonstrated that the

misattribution process may have relatively long term effect
upon the relatively stable personality variable of test an
xiety.

The present study attempted to extend the findings

of self-perception theory into the area of personality dis
positions .
A "trait" conceptualization of personality variables as
being determined by predispositional states thatmanifest
themselves stably, more or less independently of stimulus
conditions, has been seriously questioned

(Mischel, 196 8).

It was the purpose of the study to examine one of the possible
stimulus conditions that can affect personality traits.
Anxiety is generally considered to be a relatively stable
and enduring personality variable

(e.g., White, 1956).

This

study attempted to produce a change in the anxiety level of
high anxious subjects within Bern's lie-light paradigm.

That

is, subjects were asked to read a low anxious personality
statement in a situation that has in the past been associated
with true statements.

25

26
Spielberger
of anxiety:

(1966) has differentiated between two types

these two distinct anxiety factors have been

termed trait anxiety and state anxiety.

State anxiety refers

to a transitory emotional state or condition and fluctuates
over time.

Trait anxiety refers to a relatively stable in

dividual difference in anxiety proneness.

Spielberger'.s

State-Trait Anxiety Inventory was used as a dependent measure
in the present study along with the Taylor Manifest Anxiety
Sca l e .
It was hypothesized that

(1) high anxious subjects who

read low anxious statements in the presence of the truth
light will subsequently decrease their scores on the Trait
Anxiety Scale;

(2) high anxious subjects who read high an

xious statements in the presence of the lie light will sub
sequently decrease scores on the Trait Anxiety Scale;

(3) in

both conditions subjects will also subsequently decrease
scores on the State Anxiety Scale.

CHAPTER III
METHOD

Summary of Procedures
The subjects were recruited from an introductory psy
chology class at the University of Montana.

All Ss had pre

viously taken Spielberger1s State-Trait Anxiety Scale and the
Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale.

The Ss represented the top

25% of the distribution of scores on the Trait scale, defin
ing them as high anxious individuals *

The Ss were told that

they were to help prepare experimental materials for a future
experiment concerned with an individual's ability to detect
lies and truths from voice material.

The £s were first to

fill out a 50-item personal information questionnaire
and Bern, 1965; Appendix A).

(Lane

Using the items from this ques

tionnaire, subjects were asked to tape record some of their
answers correctly and some incorrectly.

The Ss were trained

to answer correctly in the presence of a distinctively
colored light

(truth light)

differently colored light

and falsely in the presence of a

(lie light).

Following this, Ss

were asked to volunteer to tape record a personality descrip
tion.

For one group of £s the description was that of a "low

anxious" person

(Appendix B) and was read in the presence of
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the truth light.

For the second group of Ss, the description

was read in the presence of the lie light and described a
"high anxious" individual

(Appendix C ) .

A third group read

the low anxious statement in the presence of a neutral light,
that is, a white light that has no association with true or
false statements.

And a fourth group read the "high anxious"

statement in the presence of the neutral light.
run individually.

All Ss were

When Ss finished reading the statement, they

were told that the tape had ran out and were asked if they would
read it one more time.
of the manipulation.

This was done to increase the salience
Following this, Ss were thanked for parti

cipating and asked if they would mind "going down the hall" and
taking a short questionnaire from another experimenter.

In the

"other experiment" Ss re-took the State-Trait and the Taylor
Manifest Anxiety Scale.

After completion of the scales, the Ss

were asked to return and fill out further questionnaires
week follow-up on State-Trait and M A S ) .

(two-

The State-Trait and

Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale were analyzed in a 3 x 4 split
plot design.
Subjects
Subjects were students from an introductory psychology
class at the University of Montana.

The Ss were selected on

the basis of their Trait score on a previously administered
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory and represented the top 25% of
the population.

All Ss were run individually.

Procedure
Upon reporting, Ss were told that they were to "assist"
in preparing experimental materials for a study on individuals'
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ability to detect truths and lies from recorded voice.

The

Ss were asked to fill out a questionnaire concerning personal
information

(Lane and Bern, 1965)

recording section.

that was used later in the

The questionnaire consisted of fifty items

and the instructions and sample question from this form are
reproduced below:
This information form will provide some of the materials
you will be recording on tape for the voice-judgment ex
periment.
It should be filled out completely and accur
ately.
THIS INFORMATION WILL .REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL AND
ANONYMOUS.
YOUR NAME WILL NOT APPEAR ON THE TAPE OR ELSE
WHERE IN THE EXPERIMENT.
( 1)
(29)

First Name ____ ________________ _________________
Do you believe in a Supreme Being?
'

After obtaining the information, Ss were seated at a desk with
a partition separating E from S. Following Bern (196 5), the
following instructions were given to the Ss:
As I mentioned, you are going to be making a tape of your
own voice to be used in some research we will be doing on
an individual's ability to judge another person's voice.
In particular, we are going to be examining an individual's
ability to judge whether the speaker on the tape is telling
the truth or not.
To do this, some of the things you will
say on the tape will be true statements; others will be
untrue.
The procedure will be as follows:
I will ask you
questions, one at a time, from the list of information you
just filled out.
After I ask you questions, I will start
the tape recorder, and you should answer into the micro
phone in front of you.
Whenever I turn on the tape re
corder, one of the two colored light bulbs1 in the lamp
fixture will also go on automatically.
If the red light
goes on (red light goes o n ) , you are to answer the question
truthfully; if, however, the blue light turns on (blue light
on; red light turned o f f ) , you should make up an untrue an
swer and speak into the microphone as convincingly and as
naturally as possible.
My questions will not be recorded
on the tape, so your answers must be complete statements,
not just single word answers.
For example, I will ask:
"What is your first name?"
When the ceiling light goes
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on, you should answer, "My first name is such-and-such."
If the light is red, then you would, of course, give your
real first name.
If the light is blue, you would make up
some other name.
As you can see, we wanted this to be
spontaneous, which is why you will not know until the
tape actually starts whether you are going to give a true
or an untrue statement; you have to be on your toes.
The
lighting circuitry is set to select the two colored lights
automatically and in random sequence.
I will be checking
your responses on your information form; when you record
in the appropriate way I will stop the tape, the colored
light will go out, and we will proceed to the next ques
tion.
If you happen to make a mistake, or do not answer
with a complete sentence we will repeat that item.
Are
there any questions?
(pause)
Okay, remember the red
light means you are to give a true answer; the blue light,
an untrue o n e .
The training procedure proceeded as described with half of the
questions requiring a true answer and half requiring a false
answer.

The lights were reversed for half the Ss; that is,

blue light for true responses and red light for false responses.
At the end of the training session, E

returned

to the S's

room and continuedas follows:
We have now completed all the questions on the informa
tion form.
In the second part of the voice judgment ex
periment, subjects will be asked to judge whether or not
a personality profile is that of a female or that of a
male.
We have had past subjects write a personality
description.of themselves, from, these descriptions we
have grouped some male statements together to produce a
male personality profile and we have grouped some female
statements together to produce a female profile.
Some
of the male personality profiles will be read by females
and some by males.
Also, some of the male personality
profiles will be read by females and some by males.
We
will ask subjects in the voice judgment experiment if
the personality profile is that of a female or that of
a male.
The choice of which one you read is up to you,
but we have had a lot of females (males) read male (female)
statements and to even out our pool of statements it would
be helpful if you read the female (male; sex same state
ment) statement, but, of course, the choice is up to you.
(pause)
One of the lights will come on, its just connected
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to the tape recorder and it will be a signal for you to
begin.
(Neutral light conditions:
the white light bulb
is also connected to the tape recorder and it will be a
signal for you to begin.)
I would like you to read the
statement as convincingly and as naturally as possible.
Okay? One of the lights will be on (white light bulb in
neutral condition) when the tape recorder is on — which
ever one is next in the sequence programmed into the cir
cuitry.
You may begin when the light comes on.
When the S_ finished reading the statement, E popped the tape
out of the recorder and said the following:
Oh!
I ran out of tape, would you mind reading the state
ment one more time? Okay?
I'll get another tape.
(E
gets a new tape.)
Again, one of the lights will be a
signal for you to begin.
You may begin when the light
comes on.
Ss were blocked along the dependent variable

(score on

Spielberger's Trait), in groups of four and then randomly
assigned to four treatment conditions.
1.

Truth light condition:

In this condition Ss read

a "low anxious" statement in the presence of the
truth light.
2.

Lie light condition:

Ss in this condition read a

"high anxious" statement in the presence of the
light that had previously been used to elicit false
statements.
3.

Neutral
tion Ss

light, low anxious condition:

In this condi

read a low anxious statement in the presence

Of a white light that had not been previously asso
ciated with either true or false statements.
4.

Neutral

light, high anxious condition:

In this con

dition Ss read high anxious statements in the presence
of a neutral light.
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In all four conditions, when the Ss finished reading the per
sonality statement the E thanked the £ for participating and
then stated the following:
Another graduate student is gathering data on some ques
tionnaires and asked me if I would ask you to participate.
He said it only takes twenty minutes or so and he will
give you an hour credit for it.
Would you like to do it?
(pause)
It's just down the hall (E leads S out and points
out the room where the testing is to be done).
Dependent Variable
The scores on the State-Trait Anxiety Scale and the Tay
lor Manifest Anxiety Scale were used as the dependent variable.
When subjects completed the above inventories they were
asked to return in two weeks and an appointment time set.

Af

ter the two-week follow-up testing, subjects were given an ex
planation of the deceptions employed, the necessity for them,
and the theories that generated the experiment.

The experi

menter elicited a promise of secrecy and dismissed the Ss.

CHAPTER IV
RESULTS

Due to a failure of three subjects to report for the
initial experimental procedure, the blocking was slightly
violated.

The resulting mean Trait Anxiety score for the

four groups was 49.92, and the four means ranged from 49.15
to 51.38.

The initial means and their movement across the

testing sessions are shown in Figure 1.
ance

An analysis of vari

(ANOVA) was conducted which indicated that there were no

significant differences between the four groups initially
(F < 1 ) .

Therefore, the assigning procedure appeared effec

tive and subsequent differences cannot be attributed to ini
tial differences between the four groups.

Similarly, an

ANOVA on the State Anxiety Inventory and Manifest Anxiety
scores yielded no significant differences indicating that '
randomization of these subject variables was effective.
Fourteen subjects were assigned to each of the four ex
perimental conditions.

However, due to the failure of two

subjects to report for the two-week follow-up testing
each of two conditions)

(one in

two subjects were randomly dropped

from the two remaining conditions.

Therefore the State-Trait

analysis was conducted on 13 subjects in each of the four con
ditions.

33

Scores

34

51504948-

47

rait

Anxiety

-

& — A Group
0— 0 Group
□— "-D Group
A — A Group

1
2
3
4

4645444 342-

41

-

40-

Figure 1.

2
3
1
(initial)(post-manipulations)(follow-up)
Testing Sessions
Mean Trait Anxiety scores as a function of testing
sessions.
The confidence interval shown is twotailed, a = .05, for group 4. Group 1 was a lowanxious statement in truth light condition; group
2, high anxious, lie light; group 3, low-anxious,
neutral light; group 4, high anxious, neutral
light.
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A 4 x 3 split-plot factorial analysis

(Kirk, 1968, p.

248) was performed on the mean Trait Anxiety scores.
summary of the analysis is shown in Table 1.
F ratio

The

A significant

(F = 36.779, df = 9/96, p <.01) was obtained across

the testing sessions

(B).

In that the subjects represented

the top 25% of the distribution, this finding is most likely
an artifact due to regression.
analysis was not significant

The overall AB interaction

(F = 1.38, df = 6/96, n.s.)

lending no support for the hypotheses that high anxious sub
jects who read low anxious statements in the presence of the
truth light and high anxious subjects who read high anxious
statements in the presence of the lie light will subsequently
decrease their scores on the Trait Anxiety Inventory.
An overall significant F ratio is not a necessary condi
tion to conduct a priori orthogonal comparisons
p. 73).

(Kirk, 196 8,

Accordingly, orthogonal comparisons were performed

between the relevant experimental and control conditions.
Their orthogonality and the results of the analyses are sum
marized in Table 2.

The hypothesis that high anxious subjects

who read a low anxious statement in the presence of a truth
light will subsequently decrease their score on the Trait
Anxiety Inventory was supported since groups one
truth light)

and three

(low anxious,

(low anxious, neutral light) differed

significantly at the post-manipulation testing session
3.28, df = 24, p <.01; comparison 1).

(t =

The comparison of group

one and three at the follow-up testing was also significant
(t = 2.11, df = 24, p <.01) although the magnitude of differ
ence did decrease during the two-week period between the
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TABLE 1
SUMMARY OP SPLIT-PLOT FACTORIAL ANALYSIS
OF TRAIT INVENTORY

Source

SS

df

MS

F

Between Subjects
Experimental conditions
S u b j . W. Groups

(A)

161.14

3

53.715

4015.85

48

83.663

1111.27
125.75

2
6

1450.31

96

0.642

Within Subjects
Repeated measures
AB

B x S u b j . W. Groups
Total

* P <.01

(B)

•

6864.33 155

555.635 36.779*
20.959
1.387
15.107
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TABLE 2
SUMMARY OF ORTHOGONAL COMPARISONS OF
TRAIT INVENTORY SCORES

Post-Manipulation
Testing 2
gp 1

gp 2

gp 3

. df

t

gp 4

Comparison 1

-1

0

1

0

24

3.28*

Comparison 2

0

-1

0

1

24

.76

Follow-Up
Testing 3
Comparison 3

-1

0

1

0

24

2,11*

Comparison 4

0

-1

0

1

24

.40

*p <.01
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post-manipulation testing sessions two and the follow-up
testing.

No significant results were found in the compari

sons between groups two and four at the post-manipulation
testing

(t = .761, df = 24, n.s.) and the follow-up testing

(t = .400, df_ = 24, n.s.).

Therefore, the hypothesis that

subjects who read a high anxious statement in the presence
of a lie light would subsequently decrease their score on
the Trait Anxiety^ Inventory was not supported.
Confounding the results to some degree was a difference
between groups three

(low anxious, neutral light)

(high anxious, neutral light)
ing.

and four

at the post-manipulation test

A two-tailed confidence interval was computed with the

use of the LSD procedure

(Kirk, 1968, p. 76).

The critical

difference needed at the .05 level was 3.14 and the differ
ence obtained between groups three and four at the post
manipulation testing was 3.46, indicating that it is unlikely
that the two means are representative of the same population
(see Figure 1).

The difference between groups three and

four at the follow-up testing

(difference = 1.23)

did not

exceed the critical difference.
A 4 x 3 split factorial analysis

(Kirk, 1968, p. 248) was

performed on the mean State Anxiety Inventory scores.
summary of this analysis is summarized in Table 3.
repeated measures variable

The

Again, the

(B) yielded a significant F ratio

(F = 5.14, df = 2/96, p <.05).

In that all four groups d e 

creased across the testing sessions, the major portion of the
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TABLE 3 '
SUMMARY OF SPLIT-PLOT FACTORIAL ANALYSIS
OF STATE INVENTORY

Source

SS

df

MS

F

Between Subjects
Experimental conditions
S u b j . W. Groups

(A)

555.12

3

185.04

7036.31

48

146.59

486.50
281.29

2
6

243.25
46.88

4541.54

96

12900.76

155

1.26

Within Subjects
Repeated measures
AB

B x Subj. W. Groups

Total

*

p <.01

(B)

5.14*
.99
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variance was most likely accounted for by regression.

The

hypothesis that State Anxiety Inventory scores would decrease
as a function of reading low anxious statements in the pre
sence of a truth light and the reading of high anxious state
ments in the presence of a lie light was not supported
df = 6/96, n.s.).

(F = .99,

Appropriate a priori orthogonal comparisons

also yielded non-significant differences.
Finally, a 4 x 3 split-plot factorial analysis

(Kirk,

196 8, p. 24 8) was performed on the mean Manifest Anxiety Scale
scores.

In that not all subjects in the State-Trait analysis

took the MAS and the failure of subjects to return for the twoweek follow-up, subjects were randomly discarded to produce an
equal sample of 11 per cell.
shown in Table 4.

The summary of this analysis is

The hypotheses that MAS scores would decrease

as a function of the reading of a low anxious statement in the
presence of a truth light and the reading of a high anxious
statement in the presence of a lie light were not supported
(F =.310, df = 6/80, n.s.) .
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TABLE 4
SUMMARY OF SPLIT-PLOT FACTORIAL ANALYSIS OF
MANIFEST ANXIETY SCALE

Source

SS

df

MS

F

BetweenSubjects
Experimental conditions
S u b j . W. Groups

(A)

55.333

3

18.444

1245.580

40

31.139

22.242
12.666

2
6

11.121
2.111

544.424

80

1880.240

131

.592

Within Subjects
Repeated Measures
AB
B x Subj. W. Groups

Total

(B)

1.634
.310

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION

The major findings of this study tend to support Bern's
basic position that a person comes to understand himself, at
least in part, through self-observation.

Within Bern's model

it could be postulated that subjects who read low anxious,
counter-dispositional statements found internal validating
cues weak and ambiguous.

In accord with self-perception

theory, subjects should seek cues to validate or invalidate
the description that they were trying to convincingly read.
In one stimulus condition, the neutral light of group three,
external cues offered little if any information as to the
veracity of the statement.

On the other hand, subjects read

ing low anxious statements in the presence of the truth light
would, in looking for external cues,

find a stimulus condition

that contained information suggesting that the statements they
were reading were true.

In line with Bern's position, the sub

jects would then tend to infer that the statements they were
reading were self-descriptive.
found between groups one
and three
reasoning.

The significant differences

(low anxious statement, truth light)

(low anxious, neutral light)

support this line of

Moreover, the significant difference obtained
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between these two groups at the two-week follow-up suggest
that the effect is relatively stable.

Suggestive evidence

for the stability of attributionally manipulated trait scores
has previously been offered by Beaman, et al.

(1972).

Also in accord with Bern's formulations, subjects reading
high anxious statements in the presence of a stimulus that
had been associated with untrue statements in the past
light)

(lie

should tend to infer that the statements were not

self-descriptive and subsequently decrease their scores on
the Trait Inventory.

The comparisons of groups two

anxious statement, lie light)

and four

(high

(high anxious state

ment, neutral light) do not lend support for this hypothesis.
A possible reason for the failure to support this hypothesis
could be that high anxious subjects who read high anxious
statements were in fact reading statements that to some ex
tent were self-descriptive.

Therefore internal validating

cues might be less ambiguous and subjects may be less likely
to search for external sources to validate or invalidate the
description.

This speculation would be congruent with Bern's

fundamental principles of self-perception theory.
Interestingly, the analysis of the State Inventory scores
produced non-significant results.

It appears that the results

obtained on the Trait Inventory did not generalize to the
subjects report of his present state of anxiety.

In this re

gard, the descriptions that the subjects read were by in large
trait in content.

That is, the statements were descriptive of
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global dispositions and appeared to have no measurable effect
on the subjects' present state of anxiety.

In accord with

I

this finding, Mischel

(1973) has pointed to "man's impres

sive discriminative facility

(p. 258)" that has been regular

ly found in studies of noncognitive personality dimensions.
Thus it seems reasonable that subjects may have lowered their
self-report scores on trait questions due to the trait state
ments they read, but yet reported no change on state related
questions.
Confounding the results of this study to some extent was
the significant difference found between groups three and
four at the testing following the experimental procedure.
These two groups differed on the statement that the subjects
read.

Group three read a low anxious personality description

and group four a high anxious description.

In both cases the

stimulus coridition was that of a neutral light.

On the basis

of past research indicating that the reading of an attitudinal
statement without further manipulation would not lead to atti
tudinal change, it was predicted that these groups should not
differ.

Since differences were observed, it could be argued

that dispositional statements substantially differ from atti
tudinal ones.

However, there is another more plausible ex

planation besides assuming that the change resulted from the
mere reading of the statement.
The change may have been mediated by an ascription of
normality by the subjects to the descriptive statements.
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Subjects were told that the description they were reading was
a collection of statements of previous subjects.
was not made explicit,

Although it

subjects could have inferred that the

composite statement was a description of a more-or-less
"average" individual.

In the high anxious conditions,

sub

jects inferring this "average" nature of the description could
have re-evaluated their own self-descriptions and conclude
that they were more "average" than they previously thought.
In other words, a subject reading a collection of "high an
xious" statements that he assumes to be "average" and at the
same time descriptive of himself to some extent, will subse
quently, on self-report, mark statements in a less extreme
way.

Psychotherapists have assumed a similar process.

Cli

ents experiencing anxiety, depression, e t c . , often seem re
assured knowing that their problems are not so unique and are
found amongst "normal" and "average" people.

It would follow

then, from an informational processing standpoint, that a per
son's self-perception is categorized, to some extent, in terms
of how he differs from or is the same as others.

A test-retest

control group would have aided in the interpretation of these
results.
To clarify this reasoning 24 new subjects were given
the high anxious personality description to read.

Half read

the statement without the instructions used in the present
study.

Next each subject rated the degree to which the des

cription appeared like an average person on a 7-point scale

anchored with "not average"

(1) and "average"

rating was 3.0 for this group.

(7).

The mean

The other 12 subjects were

told that they were to perform a part of an experiment that
had previously been conducted.

Briefly the rationale for the

voice judgment study was described.

Next the exact instruc

tions used to introduce the high anxious statements in the
present study were read followed by a request for the subjects
to read the high anxious personality description.

Finally

these subjects were asked to rate the description on the 7point scale.

As predicted, the latter groups mean of 4.6 7

indicated a greater ascription of normalacy
22, p < .01).

(t = 2.61, df =

Thus, this new information supported the specu

lation above that an attributional process may have mediated
the changes observed in high anxious statement conditions.
It could also be speculated that the same process was
involved in groups one and three
statements);

(both reading low anxious

that is, high anxious subjects reading low an

xious statements could attribute normality to the descriptions
and then assume that their anxiousness is even more extreme
than they thought.

This line of reasoning would not, of

course, affect the comparisons of the two groups reading the
same statement but it could be a variable for future investi
gation.

Moreover, an additive effect could be present in the

comparison of the two control groups.

Subjects reading low

anxious statements could have "increased" their scores and
subjects reading high anxious statements could have "decreased"
their scores, making a significant difference between the two
groups more likely.
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Mischel, in a recent book
(1972, 1973)

(196 8) and series of articles

has addressed trait conceptions of personality.

In an exhaustive review of the empirical data relevant to
trait conceptions, Mischel has concluded that there is little
evidence for the existence of global dispositions that exert
widely generalized effects on behavior.

This finding is con

trasted by the consistency often found when people rate their
own traits on questionnaires or self-reports, even though
these ratings have little to do with non-verbal behavior
(Mischel, 1968, 1973).

In other words, recall-based trait

ratings often yield data that are consistent and systematic
but not highly related to behavior based on direct observa
tion.

Moreover, traditional personality research has directed

its attention towards the behavioral correlates of question
naires and self-categorizations rather than the investigation
of the way individuals come to categorize themselves, how such
categorizations are maintained and how they change.
Mischel has postulated a set of person variables that are
congruent with Bern's self-perception model and help
the findings of the present study.

elucidate

Mischel maintains that

consistency found on self-report trait’ ratings can be under
stood from a cognitive-informational processing standpoint.
Individuals develop personal constructs or styles of self
presentation.

These cognitive structures filter new informa

tion that construct and maintain perceived consistency of self
presentation.

Such styles of presentation may be reflected in

responses to personality tests such as the Trait Inventory
used in this study.

48
Prom both Mischel's viewpoint and that of Bern's, indivi
duals self-perceptions are based upon informational input.
The subjects who read low anxious statements in the presence
of the truth light were presented with new information that
they had a lowered "trait anxiety" and subsequently lowered
their self-report ratings of trait anxiety.
found between groups three and four

The differences

(low anxious statement,

neutral light and high anxious, neutral light)
similarly understood.

could be

In the high anxious conditions sub

jects could have been presented with information that high
anxiety was more "average" than they previously thought.
Considering this new information, they reported a less ex
treme presentation of their "trait anxiety."
In that no behavioral measure of anxiety was taken, and
in light of Mischel arguments, it does not seem appropriate to
assume that the subjects actually reduced their anxiety as it
would be behaviorally or physiologically defined, but, rather,
that they re-evaluated their perception or presentation of the
quantity of trait anxiety they possess.
As previously pointed out, traditional personality re
search has directed its attention towards the behavioral cor
relates of self-categorizations in the hope they would have
utility in predicting behavior.

In Mischel's view, self

categorization is but one kind of person variable that could
tell us much about how people construct self-perception but
may have little utility in generalized behavioral predictions.
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Future directions of research could examine this question
by adding behavioral correlates to determine if the decrease
in anxiety scores reflect only self-report changes of per
sonality or are also reflective of non-verbal alterations.

CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY

It has been postulated that a person comes to under
stand himself in much the same way that a person learns of
the attitudes, beliefs and dispositions of other people;
that is, we learn of our own attitudes, beliefs and disposi
tions, at least in part, from self-observation and from these
observations we infer what we are like.

This theory has been

termed self-perception and has found support, both indirect
and direct,

from a number of experimental sources.

However,

most of the research has been directed at attitudes and
beliefs with only one study directly concerned with person
ality dispositions or traits.

The present study was an

attempt to extend self-perception theory to Trait Anxiety,
a disposition that has been considered a relatively stable
individual difference in anxiety proneness.
Using Bern's truth-lie light paradigm, it was hypothesized
that high Trait anxious subjects, as measured by Spielberger's
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, who read a low-anxious state
ment in a stimulus condition that in the past was associated
with truthful statements

(truth light) would subsequently

decrease their scores on the Trait Anxiety Inventory.

50

51
Secondly, it was hypothesized that high Trait anxious subjects
who read a high anxious statement in the presence of a stimu
lus condition that in the past was associated with incorrect
statements

(lie light) would subsequently decrease their

scores on the Trait Anxiety Inventory.

Finally, it was hy

pothesized that in both of the above conditions subjects
would also decrease their State Anxiety Inventory scores.
The prediction that high anxious subjects would read
a low anxious statement in the presence of the truth light
would subsequently decrease their Trait Anxiety scores was
confirmed in a comparison between this condition and a con
trol group.

It was also found that this change was maintained

over at least a two-week period.
The hypothesis that high anxious subjects who read a
high anxious statement in the presence of a lie light would
subsequently decrease their Trait Anxiety scores did not
receive support.

The prediction that State Anxiety scores

would also decrease as a function of reading a low anxious
statement in the presence of the truth light or reading a high
anxious statement in the presence of the lie light was not
confirmed.
Confounding the results was a significant difference ob
tained between two control groups that were not predicted to
significantly differ.

A rationale, formulated within self

perception theory, was presented to explain this obtained
difference and a post-hoc study was conducted to test this
rationale.

The post-hoc prediction was confirmed lending
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some support to the proposed rationale.

However, future

research was suggested to elucidate this observed differ
ence .
The results were discussed in terms of self-perception
theory and recent discussions and research approaches of
person variables posited by Mischel.

Also, implications

for clinical practice were discussed and future research
directions were suggested.
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PERSONAL INFORMATION FORM

1.

What

is your first name?

2.

What

is your age?

3.

When is your birthday?

4.

What is your mother's first name?

________ ______

5.

What is your father's first name?

____________>

6.

What is your school address?

7.

Do you wear glasses?

8.

Do you wear hats?

9.

What

_____________________________

■

____________________________

_____________________

______________________________

____________ ___________________ _

is your major field

of study?

______________

10.

Are you generally favorable to sororities and
fraternities?
______________________________________

11.

What is your grade-point average?

12.

In what city do your parents live?

13.

What is your best academic subject?

14.

Do you play bridge?

15.

What is the name of the last movie you have seen?

16.

Do you favor abolishing grades?

_________________

17.

What is your favorite magazine?

_______ __________

18.

What is your height?

19.

What is the color of your eyes?

20.

What is the color of your hair?

21.

Can you drive a car?

22.

What political party do you faVor?

23.

Have you taken any courses in calculus?

_________

24.

Do you consider yourself even-tempered?

_________

_______________
______________
_____________

________________________ ______

/

____________________________ _
_______________
_____________ ■

______________________________
______________
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25.

Do you play chess?

_______ __________________________

26.

What is your favorite work of fiction?

27.

Have you been to Canada?

,. .

28.

Have you been to Mexico?

___________________ ________

29.

What is your favorite type of music?

30.

Did you watch television last night?

31.

Have you even flown in a jet?

32.

Do you play a musical instrument?

33.

What graduating class are you in?

34.

Are you wearing a ring?

35.

How many psychology courses have you taken?

36.

What high school did you attend?

37.

Are you married or engaged?

38.

What foreign languages do you know?

39.

What is your favorite sport?

40.

Are you right- or left-handed?

41.

Whom would you like to see as the next
the United States?

42.

Do you learn more from lectures or discussion
_____ ;
_______________________________________
Sections?

43.

What brand of toothpaste do you use?

44.

What is the most important military service?

45.

What was the main course at dinner last night?

46.

Do you prefer hot or cold weather?

47.

Who is your favorite actress?

48.

Who is your favorite actor?

49.

Are you an extrovert or an introvert?_________ ______

50.

What is man's most heinous crime?

____________

_____________ ________

■

___________

______________

____________________
_______________
_________ ________

,
_________________________

.

___________________
___________________
_______________

_______________________
_____________________
President of

________ ______
_____
_

________________

______________________
________________________
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LOW ANXIOUS STATEMENT

My name is

(first name) and I am a (Fresh., S o p h . , J u n . ,

Sen.) at the University of Montana.

I would describe myself

as a calm person and am happy most of the time.

I approach

difficult situations in a straight-forward way and most of the
time feel successful.

I feel I have a great deal of unused

capacity that I have not turned to my advantage, but I work
hard at trying to usefully direct it.

I don't tend to worry

and fret over a lot of small things and although I have a few
personality weaknesses,
them.

I am generally able to compensate for

I don't often feel uneasy nor do I have a lot of diffi

culty in making decisions.
I think I am generally a pretty self-confident person and
although I have some problems I am generally able to overcome
them.

I prefer a Certain amount of change and variety.

Al

though once in a while I am a little restless, I am generally
able to direct my energies towards the job or task that needs
to be done.

I seldom become so restless that I have trouble

sleeping.
I feel confident about most activities I engage in and
when my performance is not as good as I would like it to be I
don't tend to worry a lot about it but usually decide to
improve next time.

Although, like everyone else, I have some

problems and disappointments, I feel my life is generally a
happy and pleasant one.
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HIGH ANXIOUS STATEMENT

My name is

(first na m e ) and I am a (Fresh., Soph., Jun.,

Sen.) at the University of Montana.

I would describe myself

as a nervous person and I am not always as happy as I want to
be.

Difficult situations tend to upset me and I often feel

insecure and worry about the outcome.

I feel I have a great

deal of unused capacity, but don't seem to have the energy to
usefully direct it to my advantage.

I seem to worry and fret

over a lot of small things and this tends to make me very up
set.

When I am called upon to make a decision I become uneasy

and have difficulty in making up my mind.
I am not as self-confident as other people are and I find
the difficulty parts of my life often hard to overcome.
prefer a certain amount of change and variety.
restless and find it difficult to direct
the job or task that needs to be done.

I

Often I am

my energies towards
Sometimes I become so

restless that I have trouble sleeping.
I d o n ’t feel as confident as I would like when I engage
in activities and when my performance is not as good as I would
like it to be, I tend to worry a lot about it, even though I
know worrying doesn't help.

Comparing myself to what I think

other people are like, I don't think my life is as happy and
pleasant as it could be.
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